California electricity crisis caused due to electricity derivatives trading ?

The California electricity crisis (also known as the Western Energy Crisis) of 2000 and 2001 resulted from the gaming of a partially deregulated California energy system by energy companies such as Enron and Reliant Energy. The energy crisis was characterized by a combination of extremely high prices and rolling blackouts. Price instability and spikes lasted from May 2000 to September 2001. Rolling blackouts began in June 2000 and recurred several times in the following 12 months.

Controversy

While initially the cause of the crisis was defined as being caused either by poorly structured deregulation or by market manipulation, after extensive investigation The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) concluded in 2003:[2]

"...supply-demand imbalance, flawed market design and inconsistent rules made possible significant market manipulation as delineated in final investigation report. Without underlying market dysfunction, attempts to manipulate the market would not be successful."

"...many trading strategies employed by Enron and other companies violated the anti-gaming provisions..."

"Electricity prices in California’s spot markets were affected by economic withholding and inflated price bidding, in violation of tariff anti-gaming provisions."

In summary, poorly structured deregulation which relied on active policing by the FERC led to situations where energy companies could manipulate the California energy market with near impunity and reap substantial profits at the expense of California energy consumers and the State.

Most proponents of deregulation suggest that the major flaw of the deregulation scheme was that it was an incomplete deregulation -- that is, "middleman" utility distributors continued to be regulated and forced to charge fixed prices, and continued to have limited choice in terms of electricity providers. Other, less catastrophic energy deregulation schemes have generally deregulated utilities but kept the providers regulated, or deregulated both.

California's utilities came to depend in part on the import of excess hydroelectricity from the Pacific Northwest states of Oregon and Washington. California's groundbreaking clean air standards favored in-state electricity generation which burned natural gas because of its lower emissions, as opposed to coal whose emissions are more toxic and release more pollutants. In the summer of 2000 a drought in the North West states reduced the amount of hydroelectric power that was available to California, though at no point during the crisis was California's sum of [actual electric-generating capacity]+[out of state supply] less than demand. Rather, California's energy reserves were low enough that during peak hours the private industry which owned power-generating plants could effectively hold the State hostage by shutting down their plants for "maintenance" in order to manipulate supply and demand. These critical shutdowns often occurred for no other reason than to force California's electricity grid managers into a position where they would be forced to purchase electricity from other suppliers who could charge astronomical rates. Even though these rates were semi-regulated, the companies (which included Enron and Reliant Energy) controlled the supply of natural gas as well. Under regulation the price of natural gas dictated the price of electricity, so manipulation by the industry of natural gas prices resulted in higher electricity rates that could be charged under the semi-regulations.

In addition, the energy companies took advantage of California's electrical infrastructure weakness. The main line which allowed electricity to travel from the north to the south, Path 15, had not been improved for many years and became a major bottleneck (congestion) point which limited the amount of power that could be sent south to 3,900 MW. Without the manipulation by energy companies, this bottleneck was not problematic, but the effects of the bottleneck compounded the price manipulation by hamstringing energy grid managers in their ability to transport electricity from one area to another. With a smaller pool of generators available to draw from in each area, managers were forced to work in two markets to buy energy, both of which were being manipulated by the energy companies.

It is estimated[3] that a 5% lowering of demand would result in a 50% price reduction during the peak hours of the California electricity crisis in 2000/2001. With better demand response the market also becomes more resilient to intentional withdrawal of offers from the supply side.

Regulation and deregulation
The deregulation of the California energy market was supported by a unanimous vote from both parties in the California legislature and signed into law by then-Governor Pete Wilson in 1996. Then-state senator Steve Peace was the chair of the energy committee and the author of the bill that caused deregulation, and is often credited as "the father of deregulation". Wilson admitted publicly that defects in the deregulation system would need fixing by "the next governor".

Part of California's deregulation process, which was promoted as a means of increasing competition, involved the partial divestiture in March 1998 of electricity generation stations by the incumbent utilities, who were still responsible for electricity distribution and were competing with independents in the retail market. A total of 40% of installed capacity - 20,164 megawatts - was sold to what were called "independent power producers." These included Mirant, Reliant, Williams, Dynegy, and AES.

Then, in 2000, wholesale prices were deregulated, but retail prices were regulated for the incumbents as part of a deal with the regulator, allowing the incumbent utilities to recover the cost of assets that would be stranded as a result of greater competition, based on the expectation that "frozen" would remain higher than wholesale prices. This assumption remained true from April 1998 through May 2000.

When electricity wholesale prices exceeded retail prices, end user demand was unaffected, but the incumbent utility companies still had to purchase power, albeit at a loss. This allowed independent producers to manipulate prices in the electricity market by withholding electricity generation, arbitraging the price between internal generation and imported (interstate) power, and causing artificial transmission constraints. This was a procedure referred to as "gaming the market." In economic terms, the incumbents who were still subject to retail price caps were faced with inelastic demand (see also: Demand response). They were unable to pass the higher prices on to consumers without approval from the public utilities commission. The affected incumbents were Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E). Pro-privatization advocates insist the cause of the problem was that the regulator still held too much control over the market, and true market processes were stymied — whereas opponents of deregulation simply assert that the fully regulated system had worked perfectly well for 40 years, and that deregulation created an opportunity for unscrupulous speculators to wreck a viable system.

Prior to deregulation, the electricity market in California was largely in private hands, though subject to intense regulation. The main players were PG&E, SCE, and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E). Those utility companies were forced to sell their generators to non-regulated private companies such as Enron and Reliant. Ownership of certain power stations was transferred in order to increase competition in the wholesale market. In return for divesting some of their power stations the major utilities negotiated a deal to protect them from their assets being stranded. Part of this deal involved price caps for retail customers.

While the selling of power plants to private companies was labeled "deregulation", in fact Steve Peace and the California legislature expected that there would be regulation from the FERC which would prevent manipulation. The FERC's job, in theory, is to regulate and enforce Federal law which would prevent market manipulation and price manipulation of energy markets. When called upon to regulate the out-of-state privateers which were clearly manipulating the California energy market, the FERC, whose chairman was appointed by President Bush, hardly reacted at all and in fact did not take serious action against Enron, Reliant, or any other privateers. FERC's resources are in fact quite spare in comparison to their entrusted task of policing the energy market.

Market manipulation

As the FERC report concluded, market manipulation was only possible as a result of the complex market design produced by the process of partial deregulation. Manipulation strategies were known to energy traders under names such as "Fat Boy", "Death Star", "Forney Perpetual Loop", "Ricochet", "Ping Pong", "Black Widow", "Big Foot", "Red Congo", "Cong Catcher" and "Get Shorty".[4] Some of these have been extensively investigated and described in reports.

Megawatt laundering is the term, analogous to money laundering, coined to describe the process of obscuring the true origins of specific quantities of electricity being sold on the energy market. The California energy market allowed for energy companies to charge higher prices for electricity produced out-of-state. It was therefore advantageous to make it appear that electricity was being generated somewhere other than California.

Overscheduling is a term used in describing the manipulation of capacity available for the transportation of electricity along power lines. Power lines have a defined maximum load. Lines must be booked (or scheduled) in advance for transporting bought-and-sold quantities of electricity. "Overscheduling" means a deliberate reservation of more line usage than is actually required and can create the appearance that the power lines are congested. Overscheduling was one of the building blocks of a number of scams. For example, the Death Star group of scams played on the market rules which required the state to pay "congestion fees" to alleviate congestion on major power lines. "Congestion fees" were a variety of financial incentives aimed at ensuring power providers solved the congestion problem. But in the Death Star scenario, the congestion was entirely illusory and the congestion fees would therefore simply increase profits.

In a letter sent from David Fabian to Senator Boxer in 2002, it was alleged that:

"There is a single connection between northern and southern California's power grids. I heard that Enron traders purposely overbooked that line, then caused others to need it. Next, by California's free-market rules, Enron was allowed to price-gouge at will."
As a result of the actions of electricity wholesalers, Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) were buying from a spot market at very high prices but were unable to raise retail rates. PG&E and SoCalEd had racked up $20 Billion in debt by Spring of 2001 (PG&E declared bankruptcy in April of that year), and their credit ratings were reduced to junk status. The financial crisis meant that PG&E and SoCalEd were unable to purchase power on behalf of their customers. The state stepped in on January 17, 2001, having the California Department of Water Resources buy power. By February 1, 2001 this stop-gap measure had been extended and would also include SDG&E. It would not be until January 1, 2003 that the utilities would resume procuring power for their customers.

Between 2000 and 2001, the combined California utilities laid off 1,300 workers, from 56,000 to 54,700, in an effort to remain solvent. San Diego had worked through the stranded asset provision and was in a position to increase prices to reflect the spot market. Small businesses were badly affected.

The involvement of Enron
One of the energy wholesalers that became notorious for "gaming the market" and reaping huge speculative profits was Enron Corporation. Enron CEO Ken Lay mocked the efforts by the California State government to thwart the practices of the energy wholesalers, saying, "In the final analysis, it doesn't matter what you crazy people in California do, because I got smart guys who can always figure out how to make money."

Enron eventually went bankrupt, and signed a $1.52 billion settlement with a group of California agencies and private utilities on July 16, 2005. However, due to its other bankruptcy obligations, only $202 million of this was expected to be paid. Ken Lay was convicted of multiple criminal charges unrelated to the California energy crisis on May 25, 2006, but he died due to a massive heart attack on July 5 of that year before he could be sentenced.

Enron traded in energy derivatives specifically exempted from regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. At a Senate hearing in January 2002, Vincent Viola, chairman of the New York Mercantile Exchange -- the largest forum for energy contract trading and clearing -- urged that Enron-like companies, which don't operate in trading "pits" and don't have the same government regulations, be given the same requirements for "compliance, disclosure, and oversight." He asked the committee to enforce "greater transparency" for the records of companies like Enron. In any case, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled "that FERC has had the authority to negate bilateral contracts if it finds that the prices, terms or conditions of those contracts are unjust or unreasonable." Nevada was the first state to attempt recovery of such contract losses.
Consequences of wholesale price rises on the retail market